Is the Doctrine of Double Effect irrelevant in end-of-life decision making? by Allmark, Peter et al.
Is the Doctrine of Double Effect irrelevant in end-of-life 
decision making?
ALLMARK, Peter, COBB, Mark, LIDDLE, B. Jane and TOD, Angela
Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at:
http://shura.shu.ac.uk/2341/
This document is the author deposited version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.
Published version
ALLMARK, Peter, COBB, Mark, LIDDLE, B. Jane and TOD, Angela (2010). Is the 
Doctrine of Double Effect irrelevant in end-of-life decision making? Nursing 
Philosophy, 11, 170-177.
Repository use policy
Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the 
individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print 
one copy of any article(s) in SHURA to facilitate their private study or for non-
commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or 
use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain.
Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive
http://shura.shu.ac.uk 
Is the Doctrine of Double Effect irrelevant in end-of-life decision making?
Abstract
In this paper, we consider three arguments for the irrelevance of the doctrine of double effect in end-of-life decision  making.   The
third argument is our own and, to that extent, we seek to defend it.  The first argument is that end-of-life  decisions  do  not  in  fact
shorten lives and that, therefore, there is no need for the doctrine in justification of these decisions.  We reject this argument;  some
end-of-life decisions clearly shorten lives.  The second is that  the  doctrine  of  double  effect  is  not  recognised  in  UK  law  (and
similar jurisdictions); therefore, clinicians cannot use it as the basis for justification of their decisions.  Against this we suggest that
whilst the doctrine might have dubious legal grounds, it could be of relevance in some ways, for example, in marking the boundary
between acceptable and unacceptable practice in relation to the clinician’s duty to relieve pain and suffering.  The third  is  that  the
doctrine is irrelevant because it requires there to be a bad effect that needs justification.  This is not the case in end-of-life  care  for
patients diagnosed as dying.  Here, bringing about a satisfactory dying process for a patient is a good effect, not a  bad  one.   What
matters is that patients die without pain and suffering.   This  marks  a  crucial  departure  from  the  double  effect  doctrine;  if  the
patient’s death is not a bad effect then the doctrine is clearly irrelevant.  A diagnosis of dying allows  clinicians  to  focus  on  good
dying and not to worry about whether their intervention affects the time of death.  For a patient diagnosed as dying, time of death is
rarely important.  In our conclusion we suggest that acceptance of our argument might be problematic for opponents  of  physician-
assisted death.  We suggest one way in which these opponents might argue for a distinction  between  such  practice  and  palliative
care; this relies on the double-effect doctrine’s distinction between foresight and intention.
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Is the Doctrine of Double Effect irrelevant in end-of-life decision making?
Introduction
"The doctrine of double effect is largely irrelevant in everyday practice" (Forbes and Huxtable 2006).
The doctrine of double effect is used in  reasoning  about  the  permissibility  of  acts  that
have both good and bad effects.  It has featured extensively in the discussion  of  end-of-
life decisions that appear to have the good effect of providing patient comfort but the  bad
effect of shortening their lives, for example through large doses of  opiates.   Its  key  use
has been in arguing for the  acceptability  of  some  end-of-life  decisions  that  appear  to
shorten  life,  such  as  heavy  sedation,  and  the  unacceptability   of   others,   such   as
euthanasia (Gillon 1999, Chappell 2002). In this paper we examine three arguments in support of the claim that the  doctrine
is now largely irrelevant.  In outline these are:
A: Empirical (or evidence based):  End-of-life  decisions  do  not  have  the  bad  effect  of
shortening lives.
B:  Legal: The doctrine of  double  effect  relies  on  a  distinction  between  foresight  and
intention that is not recognised in United Kingdom (UK) law (or in jurisdictions with similar
bans  on  physician-assisted  death).   When  deciding  which  end-of-life   decisions   are
permissible, practitioners cannot rely on a distinction the law does not recognise.
C: Ethical: Some end-of-life decisions have the effect of shortening lives  but  where  they
do, this is not a bad effect.
We argue that the first two of these arguments are unsuccessful.  The third is our own  and  we
seek to show its plausibility here.  The main thrust of our argument is that the doctrine of  double  effect  becomes  irrelevant  when
the patient’s dying is no longer viewed as an evil to be avoided.  If our argument is correct then this presents  a  problem  for  those
who wish to distinguish, say, euthanasia (as morally wrong) from terminal sedation (as permissible).  However, such people  might
be able to draw on one element of the doctrine of double effect, its use of the distinction between  intention  and  foresight.   Whilst
we set out this argument, we do not seek to defend it here.  Our aim only is to show that where  death  is  no  longer  an  evil  to  be
avoided, double effect is irrelevant.  We begin our argument with some background.
Background
Often the deaths of patients are preceded by health-care-team decisions that appear to shorten the lives of those patients.  Quill,  Lo
and Brock (1997) distinguish three types of such decisions:
• Standard pain management - this may involve  high  doses  of  opiates  that  some
clinicians believe will shorten the patient’s life.
• Withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining care - there are many  variations;  these
include withholding or withdrawing antibiotics, dialysis, ventilation, enteral  feeding
and intravenous hydration.
•  Sedation  -  again  there  are  many  variations.   The  one  most  likely  to  play  a
significant role in a patient’s death is terminal sedation: "sedating a  patient  to  the
point of unconsciousness to relieve one  or  more  symptoms  that  are  intractable
and unrelieved despite aggressive symptom-specific treatments,  and  maintaining
that condition until the patient dies" [p. 8] (Taylor 2003, National Ethics Committee., Veterans’ Health
Association. 2007).  Often, other treatment is withdrawn, such  as  artificial  hydration  and  nutrition.   In  the  discussion
which follows, we  are  generally  referring  to  terminal  sedation  rather  than,  say,  palliative  sedation  which  palliates
symptoms but does not induce unconsciousness and is not so often associated with withdrawal of other treatments.
• Physician-assisted suicide - where the physician provides  the  patient  with  lethal
medication to kill herself knowing that she will probably do so.
• Euthanasia - where the physician administers a lethal drug to the patient  with  the
intention of ending her life for the patient’s benefit.
In the UK and most of the world legal condemnation of  such  acts  extends  to  physician
euthanasia  and  assisted  suicide  (henceforth,  "physician-assisted  death").   In  certain
common circumstances the other types of end-of-life  decision  are  permitted  in  the  UK
and elsewhere. This is often explained in terms of the doctrine of double effect.
The doctrine of double effect arises from the fact that some actions appear to  have  both
a good and bad effect.  For example, heavy sedation can calm a patient’s symptoms  but
may also shorten his life.  The doctrine is used to distinguish life-shortening acts that  are
widely held to be acceptable, such as standard pain relief  or  withdrawing  life-sustaining
treatments in some circumstances, from those widely held to be  unacceptable,  such  as
euthanasia.  The doctrine states that double-effect actions are justified only if four criteria
are met (Cavanaugh 1996, Beauchamp and Childress 2001, Cavanaugh 2006):
a) The act must itself be good or permissible.
b) The bad side effect must not be the cause of the good effect.
c) The bad side effect must be foreseen but not intended by the agent.
d) The good must outweigh the bad.
Physician-assisted death is always wrong because it violates at least two of the criteria, b
and c. The other types of end-of-life decision (standard pain management, withholding or
withdrawing life-sustaining care, and  sedation)  can  meet  all  four  criteria  and  in  such
circumstances are justified.
The arguments for the irrelevance of the doctrine come from at least  two  sides  that  are
opposed on the issue of physician-assisted death.  Supporters  of  these  practices  have
sustained an assault on the doctrine of double effect over many years.  They believe that
its defeat  would  be  a  significant  step  in  the  campaign  to  change  law  and  practice.
Perhaps sensing this and the strength of  the  critique  of  the  doctrine  of  double  effect,
opponents of physician-assisted death have sought to show that current practice  can  be
defended without resort to the doctrine.  Let us now turn to those arguments, starting with
an empirical (evidence-based) argument  that  has  recently  been  put  by  opponents  of
euthanasia.
The empirical irrelevance of the doctrine of double effect
The argument is that there is no empirical evidence showing that opiates and sedation  given  appropriately  at  the  end-of-life  will
shorten a patient’s life.  Indeed, the research available suggests the opposite (Sykes and Thorns 2003a,  Sykes  and  Thorns  2003b,
Thorns 2002, Good, Ravenscroft and Cavenagh 2005). This argument is explicitly linked to  the  doctrine  of  double  effect  in  the
editorial by Forbes and Huxtable (2006) quoted at the outset of this paper.  They cite Sykes and Thorns’ work  also  in  stating  that
there is "no evidence that their [opiate] use ’in palliative care requires the doctrine of double effect as a defence’".
This argument is unconvincing. In the first place, the research evidence is not particularly strong. It is impossible to do randomised
trials of these end-of-life decisions. You could not, for example, randomise dying patients into groups that  do  and  do  not  receive
opiates and sedation. Therefore, you need to look for secondary markers.  For example, you could look for an  association  between
doses of opiates or sedatives and length of life from hospital or hospice admission to death.  However,  a  co-author  of  one  of  the
most important papers elsewhere points to the need for caution in the interpretation of such  results  (Thorns  2002).   Patients  with
more troublesome symptoms might be admitted earlier;  their  longer  survival  on  higher  doses  from  admission  could  skew  the
results.
There is a further concern  in  relation  to  the  use  of  terms  such  as  “appropriate”  and
“proper” (Sykes and Thorns 2003b).  Sykes and Thorn define as  appropriate  the  use  of  opioids  and  sedation  only  where
carefully titrated to specific symptoms.  In the first place, one might ask why this limitation is specified; why, for  example,  should
opioids not be given for their euphoric effect and sedation to induce sleep?  The answer would seem to be in part because the  latter
uses might hasten death.  Thus, having stated that the uses of opioids and sedation which hasten death  are  inappropriate,  it  is  not
surprising to find that appropriate use does not hasten death: it is a circular argument
Furthermore, many clinicians appear unconvinced by the argument.  Seale’s work shows
that practitioners believe that opiates and sedation sometimes shorten life (Seale  2006a,  Seale
2006b).  A recent literature review of palliative sedation  therapy  shows  that  clinicians  repeatedly  invoke  the  foreseen/intended
distinction of the doctrine of double effect in setting the therapy apart from euthanasia (de Graeff and Dean 2007).  And there seem
to be many clinicians who draw upon the doctrine of double effect in their justification for their  practice  of  sedation  in  palliative
care (Levy and Cohen 2005, Lo and Rubenfeld 2005, Carr and Mohr 2008).
Even were we to grant that opiates and sedation at the end of life  do  not  shorten  life  it
seems clear that many other end-of-life decisions unquestionably shorten life. These are,
in  particular,  decisions  to  withdraw  or  withhold  treatment.  If   clinicians   withhold   or
withdraw treatments such as antibiotics, hydration, nutrition, ventilation and dialysis  then
the patient will almost certainly die earlier than if they had  not.   In  the  recently  updated
British  Medical  Association  (BMA)  guidelines  on   withholding   and   withdrawing   life-
prolonging medical treatment it states (British Medical Association. 2007):
"Although the health care team may foresee that withholding or  withdrawing  life-
prolonging  treatments  will  result  in  the  patient’s  death,  this  is  fundamentally
different from action taken with the purpose or objective  of  ending  the  patient’s
life." (Section 14.1, p.18)
We conclude, then, that the  empirical  argument  for  the  irrelevance  of  the  doctrine  of
double effect fails.  Clinicians make life-shortening decisions that might be justified by the
doctrine and they invoke the doctrine in their ethical justification.  However, does UK  law
support its use?  We turn to this question next.  Non-UK readers are asked  to  bear  with
this discussion  as  it  sheds  light  on  the  doctrine’s  central  concepts  of  foresight  and
intention.  Furthermore, UK law mirrors many other jurisdictions where physician-assisted
death are banned (Price 1997).
The legal irrelevance of the doctrine of double effect
Knowingly to bring about the death of another is legally and morally problematic; usually it is a  serious  wrong.  Where  the  agent
bringing about the death has a duty of care to the person killed the wrong can be done both by act (such as giving a lethal injection)
or omission (such as failing to give life-saving aid).  Many  have  claimed  that  clinicians  may  escape  legal  liability  for  a  death
caused by an end-of-life decision provided they act in  accord  with  the  doctrine  of  double  effect  (British  Medical  Association.
2007).
However, this interpretation of the law is rejected by many legal scholars  (Kennedy  and  Grubb
2000, Tur 2002).  They argue that whether someone intended an outcome is crucial where the law requires a  Mens  Rea,  or  guilty
mind.  In homicide, for example, it marks the distinction between murder and manslaughter.  For the former to be  established,  the
prosecution must show that the defendant intended either death or grievous bodily harm; if he  did  not,  then  the  lesser  charge  of
manslaughter applies.  This legal notion of intention is non-idiomatic and has developed through case law,  including  the  cases  of
Nedrick [1986] Smith [1961] (see also, Kenny 1966) and Woollin [1998].  In the latter, a man who killed a baby by throwing it on a
hard surface was found guilty of murder even though he  said  he  did  not  intend  its  death.   The  court’s  ruling  was  that  where
someone knows that an outcome is certain or nearly certain then he cannot claim he did not intend it.  Thus in those cases  where  a
clinician makes a decision she is almost sure will shorten life (say, switching off a ventilator or  withdrawing  dialysis)  she  cannot
say the patient’s death was not intended.  And yet it is in such cases where the doctrine of double  effect,  which  would  render  the
death foreseen but unintended, seems most to be needed. Kennedy and Grubb (2000; p.2112) )state,
’[I]t is clear that a defendant does, in law, intend a consequence of his actions if  he  knows  it  to  be  a  virtually
certain outcome…"
Thus those arguing against the use of the doctrine of double effect in law say the legal  justification  for  life-shortening  end-of-life
decisions other than physician-assisted death must lie elsewhere.  On this account, the most likely basis is in the notion of the  duty
to the patient (Kennedy and Grubb 2000, Tur 2002).  Clinicians will be said not to have culpably caused a patient’s death  provided
their acts or omissions were taken in pursuit of their duty to relieve pain or suffering.  This will  be  the  case  even  though  similar
actions taken by others would be illegal.   For  example,  a  health  care  team  might  decide  to  withdraw  artificial  hydration  and
nutrition from a patient as a result of which the  patient  dies.   Provided  this  decision  accords  with  the  duty  to  relieve  pain  or
suffering it would generally be legal.  Were a relative to make the same decision for the same reason, to relieve  pain  or  suffering,
her act would not be legal.
This only extends so far; it does not include  physician-assisted  death.   The  key  cut-off
point is, claims Tur (2002) the contingency of death.  Death is causally contingent if it results causally from the  same  act
that relieves the pain or suffering.  For example, death results from the terminal sedation; relief of  suffering  also  results  from  the
sedation.  But the death is not causally necessary for the relief of suffering;  it  is  an  accidental  concomitant.   In  other  words,  in
many cases sedation is given to patients to relieve suffering without death occurring.  By contrast, death is causally necessary if the
act must cause death in order for it to relieve pain and suffering.  For example, an injection of potassium  chloride  will  not  relieve
pain and suffering except by killing the patient.
Does this analysis of the law show that the doctrine of double effect is  legally  irrelevant?
The Law Commission’s consultation paper on the  Homicide  Act  considers  whether  the
doctrine is applicable to medical practice  before  concluding  in  favour  of  Kennedy  and
Grubb’s duty-based analysis, that clinicians intend the deaths  they  foresee  but  are  not
culpable for them (The Law Commission. 2005).  Nonetheless, the report goes on to say that recognition  of  the  doctrine
can be made elsewhere in law (paragraph 4.89).
Unfortunately, the report doesn’t make clear how this  recognition  might  occur.   Several
commentators have remarked that Woollin only entitles juries to find intention in bad  consequences  foreseen;  it
does not compel them to do so (Williams 2001).  Thus when a life-shortening end-of-life decision is made the  court  might  choose
not to find intention in the mens rea sense, particularly given that clinical end-of-life decisions are beneficent,  unlike  the  violence
in the Woollin case.  Perhaps this is how the British Medical Association  in  its  guidance  on  withdrawing  and  withholding  life-
supporting treatment uses Woollin to support its line that foresight and intention are important in the law’s judgement of such  end-
of-life decisions (British Medical Association. 2007).
Does the Human Rights Act have any implication for the doctrine of double effect?  It has certainly played a part  in  some  end-of-
life cases.  Article 2 of the Act grants a right to life; section 2(1) states that "No one shall be  deprived  of  his  life  intentionally…"
In one case, of conjoined twins called Mary and Jodie, intention was taken to imply a specific purpose rather than virtual  certainty;
thus surgeons were taken not to intend the death of the so-called weaker twin when  separating  them,  even  though  its  death  was
certain (Watt 2001).  Thus Robert Walker LJ states in the conclusion,
The proposed operation would not be unlawful. It would involve the positive act  of  invasive  surgery  and  Mary’s
death would be foreseen as an inevitable on sequence of an operation which is intended, and  is  necessary,  to  save
Jodie’s life. But Mary’s death would not be the purpose or intention  of  the  surgery,  and  she  would  die  because
tragically her body, on its own, is not and never has been viable (HRLR. 2000).
However, this view was a minority view in the case.  One problem with it is  that  the  operation  appears  to  violate  the
second criterion of the principle of double effect, that the bad effect must not be the  cause  of  the  good  one.   In  the  case  of  the
conjoined twins it appears that the good  effect  (Jodie’s  survival)  is  brought  about  by  the  bad  (Mary’s  death).   Grubb  (2004)
suggests that this case is probably better seen as a case of someone being destined to die.  He compares it to a climber who cuts the
rope that links him to a colleague who is pulling both of them into an abyss.  Cutting the rope is justified because  the  colleague  is
destined to die not because of double effect (although Grubb is not clear whether  this  would  constitute  a  legal  defence  or  not).
Furthermore, the doctrine has not been supported in other  cases;  for  example,  Dame  Butler-Sloss  took  withdrawal  of  artificial
nutrition and hydration to be intentionally hastening death but not a violation of Article 2 because it was an omission rather than an
act (Samanta and Samanta 2005).  There is, then, no consistent line in these cases that would support the doctrine of double  effect;
there is, however, ambiguity.  Hence Grubb (2004, p. 1110) describes the law relating to double effect as ’worryingly opaque’.
This ambiguity is reinforced by the wording of the Mental Capacity Act (HMSO 2006) which at section 4(5)
states that a person, such as a palliative  care  professional,  making  a  decision  about  life-sustaining  treatment  "must  not  …  be
motivated by a desire to bring  about  his  death."   This  gives  prima  facie  support  to  double  effect  in  that  it  implies  that  the
professional’s desire (or motivation) in relation to the outcome is of legal relevance.
A final way in which the doctrine  might  be  recognised  in  law  is  in  the  content  of  the
clinician’s duty.  It will be  recalled  that,  according  to  some  commentators  opposed  to
double effect, this appears to be the basis upon which life-shortening decisions  could  be
justified.  However, it is noteworthy that the limits to  that  duty  are  allegedly  set  by  the
notions of contingency and necessity.  A death that is causally necessary in  the  relief  of
symptoms is not acceptable.  This appears to reflect closely the clause of the doctrine  of
double effect which states that the bad effect must not be the cause of the good effect.  It
also appears to reflect the clause stating that the bad effect  may  be  foreseen  but  must
not be intended by the agent.  It is plausible to say that a clinician foresees but  does  not
intend side effects (where death is a foreseen side effect  of  treatment);  it  is  surely  not
plausible to say a clinician does not intend death where it is a chosen means to an end.
We conclude, therefore, that whilst there is certainly some legal  ground  to  question  the
relevance of the doctrine of double effect, the debate  is  far  from  settled.   Furthermore,
the doctrine seems important in relation to the area of clinicians’ duty to relieve  pain  and
suffering.   The  doctrine  effectively   marks   the   boundary   between   acceptable   and
unacceptable practice under that duty.  We  turn  finally  to  an  ethical  argument  for  the
irrelevance of the doctrine.
The ethical irrelevance of the doctrine of double effect in the light of a diagnosis of dying
There might be another tack that opponents of physician-assisted death could take in doing without the  doctrine  of  double  effect.
This would involve drawing on the use of the diagnosis of dying.  The National Institute for Health and Clinical  Evidence  (NICE)
is the official body that makes decisions concerning which treatments should be provided by the National Health Service in the UK
and provides guidance on how those treatments should be provided.  It has published guidance  on  palliative  care  for  adults  with
cancer (National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 2004).  These are reinforced by the Department  of  Health’s  "End  of
life care strategy"  (Department  of  Health.  2008).   Both  make  repeated  approving  reference  to  the  Liverpool  integrated  care
pathway for the dying patient and  similar  pathways  (Ellershaw,  Ward  and  Neuberger  2003,  Ellershaw  and  Wilkinson  2003).
Central to the Liverpool care pathway is the importance of diagnosing dying. Once such a diagnosis is made the  pathway  instructs
clinicians to stop non-essential and inappropriate treatments and to start  treatments  that  are  essential  for  symptom  relief  of  the
dying, particularly those that control pain, agitation and secretions.
The diagnosis of dying appears to bring a conceptual and material  change  to  end-of-life
decisions.  Once a patient is diagnosed as  dying  the  clinicians  following  the  Liverpool
integrated  care  pathway  cease  concern  with  saving  the  patient’s  life;  their   primary
intention becomes to ensure  the  patient  dies  well,  for  example,  with  good  control  of
symptoms.  The time of death becomes irrelevant.  If a patient dies  with  good  symptom
control on Tuesday rather than bad symptom  control  on  Wednesday  then  there  is  no
harm done.
Someone might reply that other things being equal a longer life  is  better  than  a  shorter
one; it is better to live until Wednesday  rather  than  Tuesday.   But  this  is  questionable
once a patient is dying.  One  way  of  showing  this  is  to  imagine  a  situation  in  which
terminal sedation is used and has  successfully  controlled  symptoms.   Should  we  now
think that a good death for this patient requires that we ensure he lives longer rather than
shorter?  If that were so we should feed and hydrate him perhaps - but it  seems  unlikely
that anyone would view living, say, an extra 24 hours in this state would make for a better
death.  Or consider a situation where a patient with terminal lung cancer has good control
of all symptoms, is fairly sedated but occasionally  conscious,  and  has  seen  the  family
and friends he wishes to see.  We could make him live longer by,  say,  giving  antibiotics
but should we?  Would an extra day or two make for a better death?  The Liverpool  Care
Pathway appears to suggest not, or not necessarily.
Once a patient is diagnosed as dying, his death is no longer  something  the  health  care
team seeks to avoid.  This change in attitude to a patient’s death is  central  to  end-of-life
care.  And it appears to undermine the relevance of the  doctrine  of  double  effect.   The
doctrine is relevant only where a bad effect is foreseen and  a  good  effect  intended.   In
end-of-life care clinicians intend patients have  a  good  dying  process.   They  no  longer
seek life-prolonging or avoid life-shortening interventions.  In many, perhaps most, cases,
the timing of death is irrelevant  for  a  dying  person.   A  diagnosis  of  dying  appears  to
remove the assumption that dying is a harm to be avoided; as such, it  renders  irrelevant
the doctrine of double effect; when clinicians give treatment  that  helps  a  patient  to  die
well, that dying is a good effect, not a bad one.
Thus far, both opponents and proponents  of  physician-assisted  death  might  agree.   It
seems,  then,  that  some  decisions  which  hasten  death  might  be   justifiable   without
recourse to the doctrine of double effect.  The problem then for  opponents  of  physician-
assisted death becomes whether  decisions  that  they  would  deem  appropriate  with  a
diagnosis of dying can be insulated from  those  forbidden  acts  such  as  euthanasia.   If
some life-shortening acts are permitted in order to ensure a good death, such as terminal
sedation or withdrawal of antibiotics, then why not others, such as lethal injection?  Could
not such actions be said to intend and achieve a good death with no bad effect foreseen,
once we have declared a shorter life not to be necessarily bad?
It seems, then, that giving up the idea that the death of a dying patient is the bad  consequence  of  acts  with  good  intent  causes  a
problem for opponents of physician-assisted death.  These opponents  might  respond  that  even  where  a  patient’s  death  without
suffering is unequivocally good, there is an important moral difference between bringing it about by killing the patient  rather  than
by symptom control.  Here, the main objection to physician-assisted death is not based on the doctrine of double effect.   Rather,  it
is an objection to clinicians acting as beneficent killers.  Nonetheless, this response still requires the doctrine’s distinction  between
intention and foresight.  Take the example of life-shortening  terminal  sedation  versus  euthanasia.   In  both  cases,  the  clinicians
intend that the patient dies well.  But it is only when giving a lethal injection that the clinician intends to kill the patient simpliciter.
 Hence the discussion of the rights and wrongs of physician-assisted death in relation to those diagnosed and  dying  does  not  turn
on the idea that there is a double effect in which the patient’s death is an evil to be avoided, because ex hypothesi it  is  not.   Rather
it turns on the idea that to act with the intent to kill is wrong (or wrong in such cases) even though the patient’s death is not an evil.
 In this paper we shall not contribute to the discussion over whether to act with intent to kill is wrong even when the death  itself  is
not an evil.  For now, it is enough to highlight the need for this debate.
Conclusion
We have surveyed three arguments for the irrelevance of the doctrine of double effect.  Of these, the ethical argument  seems  most
powerful.  It seems that the diagnosis of dying could mark a significantly different way of thinking about the  ethics  of  end-of-life
decision making and remove the relevance of the doctrine of double effect.  This could be  a  helpful  way  of  thinking  that  would
remove the is-it-or-is-it-not-euthanasia anxiety that sometimes attaches to these decisions.  We have suggested,  however,  that  the
doctrine’s distinction between intention and foresight would remain important for those who wish to distinguish  physician-assisted
death from palliative care; when clinicians follow the end-of-life care pathways linked to the diagnosis  of  dying  they  intend  that
the dying patient will die well; they do not intend ever to kill the patient.  We have not sought to  defend  the  ethical  soundness  of
the intention/foresight distinction.  If we have successfully shown that much end-of-life care does not meet the second  criterion  of
the doctrine of double effect (that the bad effect must not be the cause of the good one) then that is  enough  to  establish  the  claim
that the doctrine is irrelevant in such cases.
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